sees the Neoplatonic emanationist metaphy s i c s , w h i c h makes the d e m i u r ge a mere l y contemplating intellect,instead of a contemplating and producing intellect. 2 Indeed, in Proclus' view the demiurge is a m o t i o n l e s s 3 t r ansmitter of the higher re a l i t i e s , c r eating by pro c e s s i o n . And although Pro clus would pro b abl y contest this and maintain that his demiurge possesses a true efficient causality, the nature of the d e m i u r ge 's causation in an emanationist 4 m e t a p hysi cal context is simply not the same as that in Plato. 5 For Pro c l u s , gi ven the context of his hiera r chic ontology, t o explain who the demiurge 6 is amounts to determining his position in the hiera r chy of beings. In order for us to understand Pro cl u s ' a r gument it is mandatory to be familiar not only with the ge n e ra l o u t l i n e , but even with some of the details of his system. R e a l i t y a c c o rding to Pro clus is graded according to the degree of unity in beings.The supreme principle is the One itself, w h i c h tra n s c e n d s B e i n g . The beings themselves proceed from and reve r t to the One in a continuous hiera r chy, s t a r ting from the intelligi b l e s , i . e . t h e t ranscendent go d s , via the gods of the wo r l d , d own to the leve l s of soul, n a t u re , b o dy, and matter (the lowest manifestation of the O n e ) .This complex metaphysical stru c t u re is developed by Pro cl u s t h rough his interpretation of the second part of the Pa r m e n i d e s . The fi r st hy p o t h e s i s , w h i ch is entire ly negative , he believes re fe r s to the supreme pri n c i p l e ; the second displays the hiera r chy of Leiden, 1973. 4 . I do not take " e m a n a t i o n " in the re s t ricted sense in which it is used by L.P. Gerson in his discussion of Plotinus (as a per accidens causal seri e s ) : P l o t inu s (The A r guments of the Philosophers), London and New York, 1994, ch. 2. Actually, for the present purpose, the notion of "motionless pro d u c t i o n " w i l l do (a notion that can also be used in creationist accounts).
5 . For Neoplatonists, the demiurge is an efficient cause, because he pro d u c e s in virtue of his activity (e n e rge i a ) , motionless as it may be. C f . In Ti m . 3 . 2 2 8 . 2 6 -2 8 : poiei' gav r, aj lla; dia; tw' n nev wn qew' n: pri; n ga; r ou| toi poihv sousin, ej kei' no" pepoiv hke tw' / noh' sai mov non. T h e u n i v e r sal demiurge transmits the powe rs of the higher realities in order to cre a t e the world of becoming, and re m a i n s fi r m ly established in the immobile re a l m of the intelligi ble (l a r go sensu) . On how the notion of an efficient cause has ch a nged since A r i s t o t l e , see R.
S o rab j i , Ti m e , C r eation and the Continu u m . Th e o ri e s in Antiquity and the Early Middle A g e s,
L o n d o n , 1 9 8 3 , p . 3 0 8 -3 1 1 . P r o c lus eve n a t t ri b utes efficient causality to the Fo r m s .
C f. C . S t e e l , La théorie des Fo rmes et la P rov i d e n c e . P ro clus critique d'Ari s t o t e et des stoïciens, i n :
A ristotelica Secunda. M é l a n ges offe r ts à Christian Rutten. P u b liés sous la direction d'André Motte et de Joseph Denooz, L i è g e , 1 9 9 6 , p . 2 4 1 -2 5 4 . That is why Pro clus can claim that the fi r st ori gin of all demiurgic activity is to be situated in the paradigm (cf.i n f r a) .
6 .Whe n Pro clus speaks of demiurgi c activity or causation, he means an activity that is related to the ge n e r ation of the world of becoming.This ex c ludes the p r oduction through procession of the higher ord e r s of re a l i t y. C f. In Ti m . 1.260. 19-26. gods in the succession of attri b u t e s 7 a f fi r med of the One [see Appendix 1]. 8 Late Athenian Neoplatonism is ch a r a c t e r ised by a pro l i f e r ation of hypostases.This is a logical development of Iamblichus' law of the mean terms or the principle of ontological continu i t y : a ny two s u c c e s s i v e ontological ord e r s must always share an essential quality so that there are no gaps in the divine emanation. 9 T h e re fo re , i n o rder to avoid ontological gaps, i n t e r mediate levels need to be i n s e rt e d . The application of this pri n c i p l e , t o gether with the necessity to find an ontological level corresponding to each of the attributes affirmed of the One in the second hypothesis of the Parmenides, and the need to accommodate all the divinities and principles fo u n d t h rou ghout Plato's wo r ks as well as in the Orphic and Chaldean re l i g ious tra d i t i o n s , explains the complexity of Neoplatonic ontology. The main division of the Intelligible in the broad sense [II] is that b e t w een Being (or the Intelligi bles s t r icto sensu [ 2 ] ) , L i fe (or the I n t e l l i gi bl e -I n t e l l e c t i v e level After having quoted Ti m . 2 8 C 3 -5 , P r o clus announces that he will fi rst examine the key wo r ds (h J l e v x i ") and then discuss the issue as a whole (hJ o{ lh qewriv a). His main argument is to be found in the t h e o r i a-s e c t i o n , w h e r e he tackles the controve r sial issue of the d e m i u rge 's ontological status. An account of his own position is p r eceded by a survey of the major interpretations of his pre d e c e s s o rs [see Appendix 2 for a survey of the lemma].
After an examination of the l e xe i s , P ro c lus distinguishes two q u e s t i o n s :"Who is the demiurge ? " and " To which class of beings does he belong"? 10 It is not immediately clear why an answer to the first question would not automatically constitute an answer to the second as we l l . In dealing with the second, P r o c lus endeavo u r s to determ i n e the precise correspondences with the divine names as found in the tradition of the Chaldean Ora cl e s , m o re pre c i s e ly the re l a t i o n b e t w een the demiurge and the so-called triad of a j r c i k o i v ( w h i ch will be situated at level 5.1 of the sch e m e ) . His main arg u m e n t , h o weve r, is to be found in the first part of the theoria, where he tackles the c o n t rove rsial issue of the demiurge 's ontological status. For the sake of cl a r i t y, let us fi r st take a look at Pro cl u s ' own view, w h i c h is e s s e n t i a l l y that of his master Syri a n u s . P ro c lus sees a clear bre a k b e t w een Syri a n us and the "ancient interpre t e r s " . He adds that his
Études platoniciennes II 7 . The attributes revealed in the second hypothesis correspond to the negations in the first hypothesis.
8 . In the fo l l owin g page s , nu m b e r s in s q u a r e bra c kets are those of Appendix 1. master is closest to Plato. 11 It is of course Proclus' view that Plato had a divine insight into the truth about the gods and that there is essential agreement between his teachings and those of the Chaldean O r a c les and the Orphic poems.Yet Plato surpasses these other sourc e s of wisdom,because in addition to their modes of ex p o s i t i o n , he uses, most notably in the Pa rm e n i d e s , the dialectical mode, w h i c h is dire c t and uses abstract,'scientific' terms. 12 What then does Syri a nu s , a c c o rdi ng to Pro cl u s , t e a ch ab out the d e m i u r ge? The demiurge is the god that " m a rks the border of the I n t e l l e c t i v e go d s ." 1 3 He is filled with the power of the intelligi b l e monads and the sources of life (the hypostases ab ove Intellect, [ 2 ] and [3]); f r om him proceeds all demiurgic activity;he himself re m a i n s undisturbed at the top of the Oly m p o s , 1 4 while presiding over the l ower demiurgic gods (1.310.9-15). He is the " m a ker and father of the unive r s e " . H o weve r, d i f fe rent fo r ms of demiurgy need to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d . W h e reas "the one demiurge " c reates and exe rc i s e s p r ov i d e n c e 1 5 over unive r sal beings in a unive r sal way and is called "the cause that produces unive r sal beings in a unive rsal way " (t w ' n o{ lwn oJ likw' " dhmiourgiko; n ai[ tion) , P ro clus in addition ack n ow l e d ge s the demiurgy that is the cause for partial beings in a unive rsal way (tw' n merw' n oJ likw' ") , the demiurgy for unive rsal beings in a part i a l way (tw' n o{ lwn merikw' ") and the demiurgy for partial beings in a p a r tial way (tw' n merw' n merikw' ", 1 . 3 1 0 . 1 5 -1 8 ) . The fi r st demiurgy is situated at [4.1.3] in the sch e m e ; the second demiurgy is the wo r k of the demiurgic triad at [5.1], 1 6 w h i c h is dependent on the d e m i u r gic monad (i.e. the fi r st demiurgy [4.1.3]). 1 7 The third and fo u r th demiurgy, w h i c h proceed in a partial way, a n a l o go u s ly consist of a monad (Dionysus) and a triad operating at the encosmic leve l [ 7 ] 1 8 (our know l e d ge of the lower part of Pro cl u s ' s cheme is i n c o m p l e t e , m a i n l y because the corresponding parts of the P l a t o n i c Th e o l o g y a r e not extant -if they we re ever written at all; t h e ge n e ral ru l e , h o weve r, is that the scheme becomes more complex as one moves dow n wa rds and unity decre a s e s ) . In addition to these four leve l s , t h e re is also demiurgy at an even lower leve l , n a m e l y that carried out by the assistants of the partial demiurge s , the ange l s and hero e s , to which Pro clus alludes at 1.310.24-26.The diffe re n c e b e t w een the unive rsal (o J l i k w ' ") and the partial (m e r i k w ' ") demiurgy c o r responds to that between the fi rst and the second demiurgy of the Ti m a e u s (that of the young go d s , whose responsibility is explained at Ti m . 42D5 sqq.). 1 9 In other wo rd s , the fi r st two leve l s of Pro cl u s ' s c heme ([4.1.3] and [5.1]) correspond to the fi r s t , a n d P r o cl u s ' t h i rd and fo u r th level (both at the encosmic hypostasis [7] ) to the second demiurgy of the Ti m a e u s . The unive r sal demiurgy ([4.1.3] and [5.1]),i . e . the fi rst demiurgy of the Ti m a e u s,c o m p l e t e ly t r anscends the wo r l d , while that of the young gods (a monad and a triad in the encosmic realm [7] ) is immanent to the wo r l d . 2 0 I n the present paper I shall confine myself to the demiurgic monad re s p o n s i bl e for the unive rsal demiurgy, the " m a k er and father of the u n i ve rs e " . As lower limit of the Intellective go d s 2 1 he is the third t e r m of the " t r iad of the pare n t s " , K r o n o s , R h e a , Z e u s . 2 2 Let us n o w examine the exe getical reasons put fo r w a rd in the C o m m e n t a r y 2 3 for assigning the demiurge to this particular place in the ontological hiera rchy. P r o c lus claims (1.311.5-14) that Plato's description of the demiurge and his actions allow us to determine his rank infa l l i bly. W h e n c re a t i n g , the demiurge contemplates (Ti m . 29A3) the intelligi bl e model. Now, that which looks at the intelligible is itself intellective 1 9 . C f . In Ti m . 3 . 3 1 6 . 2 1 -3 1 9 . 1 . T h e first demiurgy is "invisible", as opposed to the second. Cf. In Tim. (n o e r o v " ) , i . e . an intellect (n o u ' ") . 2 4 Hence the demiurge is distinct fro m [2] the intelligi bl e ; He does not belong to [3] the intelligi bl e -i n t e l l e c t i ve realm either,for Plato ex p l i c i t l y says that he is an intellect. 2 5 By say i n g that the demiurge is the best of causes (Ti m . 29A6) Plato furt h e r distinguishes him from the lower demiurge s . 2 6 The conclusion so fa r is that the demiurge is an intellective god transcending the other d e m i u r ge s . 2 7 N o w his precise place within the main intellective tri a d [4.1] remains to be determined (1.311.14-25). If he we r e the fi r st in the tri a d , he would limit himself to his inner activity, 2 8 for this is typical of the fi r st member of any ord e r. But of cours e , as a demiurge he must a l s o h ave an outwa rd activity. 2 9 T h e re fo re he cannot be the fi r st intellective go d . If he we r e the second intellective go d , he wo u l d ab o ve all be the cause of life , for this pertains to the second term in a n y tri a d . But for the creation of the soul he needs the use of a pri n c i p l e ex t e r nal to himself,the mixing bowl (oJ krathv r -identified with Hera ) , 3 0 w h e r eas when he imparts intelligence (n o u ' ") to the unive r s e , he is able to do so entire ly on his own (for the creation of body he c o l l a b o r ates with Necessity).So he is pri m a ri ly the cause of intellection, not of life . 3 1 T h e r e f o r e he must be the third of the intellective fa t h e rs 3 2 -the third is typically the intellective term of a tri a d . 3 3 The demiurge
Études platoniciennes II 2 4 . Other typical activities of intellect are discove ring and re a s o n i n g . C f. Th e o l . P l a t . V 14, p . 4 9 . 1 7 -2 0 . C f. Ti m . 30B1 (logisav meno" ou\ n hu{ risken) and B4; 39E9 (kaqora' / ).This, however, should not be understood litera l ly,since there is no ch a n ge in the demiurge . C f. In A l c . 208.3-5 (on the cognition of our soul, as opposed to that of intellect): ej n kinhv sei gav r ej sti kai; ouj k aj qrov w" ouj de; aj metablhv tw" uJ fev sthken, w{ sper hJ tou' nou' mov nimo" kai; diaiwv nio" ej nev rgeia.See also Plotinus Enn.VI 7 [38] 1-3.
2 5 . C f . Ti m. 39E7-9 (cf. i n f r a) , a n d 47E4-48A2 (here , h oweve r,n o u ' " m ay also refer to the lower intellects in charge of the second demiurgy).
2 6 . The mention of causes in this context is indeed to be taken as a reference to demiurgy, says Proclus, for this can be inferred from the words pa' n de; au\ to; gignov menon uJ pae aij tiv ou tino; " ej x aj nav gkh" giv gnesqai (Ti m.28A4-5 ) which are closely followed by an explicit mentioning of the demiurge (A6: o{ tou me; n ou\ n a] n oJ dhmiourgo; " ktl.) . C o m p a re P h ilebus 26E1-8. 
n oJ prwv tisto" h\ n ej n toi' " noeroi' ", e[ menen a] n mov non ej n tw' / eJ autou' kata; trov pon h[ qei.
This is a subtle point: t h e d e m i u r ge " r emains in his own accustomed nature " (Ti m . 4 2 E 5 -6 ) , but this does not exclude his activity from being directed outward.This again should not be understood as if his outward activity we re something additional to his internal activity, for the unive rsal demiurge creates by his very being. 29. One could refer to diatav xa" ibid e m (Ti m . 4 2 E 5 ) . P ro clus distinguishes these two types of activities at In Tim. creates, by his very being, the intellect which he then places in the soul (Ti m. 3 0 B 4 ) . The latter intellect is there fo r e , a c c o rdin g to the c a t e go ries that are fundamental to Pro c l u s ' m e t a p h y s i c s , a part i c i p a t e d i n t e l l e c t , w h e r eas the fo r mer (the demiurge himself) is the i m p a r t i c i p a ble intellect from which the participated intellect proceeds.
P r o clus points out that Plato is ve r y careful in his use of titles and n a m e s : he calls the demiurge an intellect, but never intelligi b l e , whereas the paradigm is called intelligible but never intellective. 34 Plato is also ve r y consistent in his use of the title " m a ker and fa t h e r " , w h i ch , a c c o rding to Pro cl u s , he only bestows upon the unive r s a l d e m i u r ge . P rev i o u s l y, in the l e xe i s-s e c t i o n , P ro clus has alre a d y re f u t e d Porphyry's view that the term"father"refers to a creation ex nihilo. P ro clu s there explains that this cannot be what the term means, since the demiurge uses " s t u f f" w h i ch he does not create himself, namely matter (Proclus holds that matter is created by the supreme p ri n c i p l e , being the lowest manifestation of its unlimited powe r ) . Now, 35 after having firmly established the position of the universal d e m i u r ge , P ro clus comes back to the meaning of the title " m a ke r and fa t h e r " , and specifies its precise meaning by distinguishing it f rom the titles " fa t h e r " , " f ather and make r " , and " m a k e r " . The title " f a t h e r " belongs to the summit of the intelligi bles [2.1],w h e reas the m e re " m a k e r s " a re the young gods who bring into existence the partial and mortal encosmic beings [7] .The title "father and maker" characterises the third intelligible triad, intelligible intellect, which is the paradigm of the unive r se and the ve r y fi rst cause of all demiurgy (to; auj tozw' / on [ 2 . 3 ] ) . " M a k er and fa t h e r " , fi n a l ly, singles out the universal demiurge.Whenever he is referring to the demiurge, Plato does not call him simply "father" or "maker" or "father and maker", but only names him by the formula "maker and father". Plato does so at the beginning of the physical account (the present lemma), and uses an equivalent fo r mula in the demiurge 's address to the young gods at 41A7 (w| n ej gw; dhmiourgo; " pathv r te e[ rgwn), just as the Eleatic Stra n ger in the S t a t e s m a n does when re f e r ring to the maker of the world (Pol. 273B1-2: tou' dhmiourgou' kai; patrov ").
In the next subsection Pro clus argues that the unive r sal demiurge is called Zeus by Orpheus and explains that the Orphic and Platonic t e a chi ngs are in harm o n y on this subject, as they are in ge n e r a l . The tale of Zeus swa l l owing Phanes, for instance, c o rresponds to the Platonic doctrine that the demiurge interiorises the paradigm (the equivalence between Phanes and the third intelligible triad is here taken for granted). But Plato too explicitly calls the demiurge Zeus, for instance in the same passage of the S t a t e s m a n or at P h i l e b u s 30D.This equivalence is confirmed by a number of other passages in various dialogues, such as Cratylus 396A8-B3, where the double e t y m o l o gy of " Z e u s " ( g e n i t i v e D i o v " and Z h n o v ") is ex p l a i n e d : " t h r o u g h whom (di'o{ n) all possess life (to; zh' n)." 36 The last part of the discussion is devoted to the question as to w h i c h class of gods the demiurge belongs: is he one of the fo n t a l (p h g a i ' o i) or one of the ruling gods (a j r c i k o i v)? This distinction stems f rom the tradition of the Chaldean ora c les and their exe g e s i s . 3 7 Proclus argues that the demiurge belongs to the higher class of the two, that of the Sources (the fontal gods), not without adding that a lengthy treatment would be needed to determine his exact position among the Sources. 38 Proclus concludes (In Tim. 1.319.11-21) by saying that one can e a s i l y understand why Plato was right in saying that it is not easy to discover the nature of the demiurge. However, now it should at least be clear what the words "maker and father" mean.Those who think that the demiurge is maker for the inanimate beings and fa t h e r for the ensouled beings only, are wrong.The demiurge, by a single, undivided activity, is father and maker for all beings. Proof of this is that he calls himself " f ather of these wo rk s " ( 4 1 A 7 , a d d ressing the young gods). He does so because he is cause of both the substance and the unification of the " wo rk s " ( e ve r y being is one), and both supplies their existence and exercises providence over them once they have come into being. 3 9 . It is re m a rk able that Pro c l u s c o n c ludes with a polemical re m a r k , s i n c e he had alre a dy refuted Po r p hy r y 's interp retation of " m a ker and fa t h e r " in the l e xe i s -p a rt of the lemma and placed the c ritical survey of previous interpre t a t i o n s at the beginning of the t h e o r i a-s e c t i o n . N u m e n i u s , t o o , t reats the maker and the father as two distinct entities,and Pro c l u s has criticised him for this: in Ti m . 1 . 3 0 4 . 1 3 -1 6 . In his polemical re m a r k at the ve r y end Pro c lus does not name his o p p o n e n t s , but he may be re fe r ring to some of the philosophers he has discussed earlier. Or he may have others in m i n d : a similar view is mentioned in Plut a r ch of Chaero n e a 's Platonic Question II 1000EF.A c c o r ding to the fi r st interpretation re p o rted by Plutarch , " f a t h e r " a n d " m a k e r " a r e mu t u a l ly ex c l u s i v e term s , t h e fo r mer for animate, the latter for inanimate beings.P l u t a r ch 's own view is to be found in the third interpre t a t i o n ( 1 0 0 1 A B ) ; he argues that a father is a cre ator of an animate being (eve ry father is,by c o n s e q u e n t , also a maker) and insists on the fa t h e r 's providence for its cre a t u r e s .
Let us now take a look at Proclus' survey of the interpretations of his pre d e c e s s o r s . B e f o r e explaining his own and his master's view s , P ro clus discusses cri t i c a l ly the dive r gent views of his Platonic predecessors,"for different philosophers among the ancients were led to different opinions"(1.
we re alre a dy treated as one group by P r o c l u s . 4 0 P ro clus re p r o a c hes them for neglecting the tra n s c e n d e n c e of the first principle. Numenius (1.303.27-304.22) celebrates three gods, the first of whom he calls "father", the second "maker", while the creation is the third go d . N ow, if he means that the " fa t h e r " i s indeed the ve r y fi r st God, he makes the unfo rgi v able mistake of making the Good a principle among others . If Numenius we re ri g h t , Plato would even be making the Good lesser than the " m a ke r " a t Ti m . 2 8 C 3 -4 . Be that as it may,Numenius in any case does not re s p e c t the absolute transcendence of the supreme pri n c i p l e : the One is not to be set in any relation with infe rior things,although the latter re fe r to it. 41 Moreover, it is not appropriate to call the supreme principle " fa t h e r " , as this title makes its appearance in the classes of go d s below the One.Another mistake is to separate the "father" and the "maker", for Plato is speaking about one single demiurgy and one single demiurge (1.303.24-304.22).
Numenius' view of the demiurge is more complex than Proclus allows for. Moreover, it is very unlikely that Numenius' third god is identical with the wo r l d . N u m e n i u s ' t h ree gods are rather (1) the first intellect, demiurge of being; (2) the second intellect, demiurge of becoming.The latter then divides into (2a) a tru l y divine intellect, and (2b) a demiurgic intellect. H ow then can we make sense of TO 
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Études platoniciennes II 4 0 . Although the term "Middle Platon i s m " was fo r ged by nineteenth century s c h o l a rs to denote post-Antiochean prePlotinian platonism,P r o c lus seems to obse r ve a certain kinship among the thre e p h i l o s o p h e r s he mentions; H a r p o c ra t i o n is said to fo l l ow Numenius (e{ petai tw' / de tw' / aj ndriv ) by distinguishing three gods and making the demiurge two f old (1.304.24-2 6 ) , w h e r eas Atticus is identified as the teacher of Harpocration (1.305.6-7). T h e t h r ee of them are grouped together befo r e P r o c lus begins his discussion of the view of Plotinu s : meta; dh; touv tou" tou; " a[ ndra" Plwti' no" oJ filov sofo" ktl. ( 1 . 3 0 5 . 1 6 -1 7 ) .
41. Cf. 1.304.10-11.
P r o cl u s ' t e s t i m o ny re g a rdi ng the third go d ? 4 2 Perhaps Numenius indeed used the wo r d ko s m o s
( 1 , 3 0 4 , 1 ) , but not in order to re fe r to the material world as such, but to its order; this order could then be held to be identical with the world soul (and therefore with the demiurge; cf. infra). 43 H a r p o c r ation (304.22-305.6) is outright ridiculed by Pro cl u s , w h o p r etends to doubt whether Harpocration could make sense even to h i m s e l f. Not only is he inconsistent and wave ri n g , he appare n t l y has a tendency to confer a multitude of names and titles upon the One, w h i c h ought to remain free of all multiplicity and cannot be named ( 1 . 3 0 4 . 2 2 -3 0 5 . 6 ) . A t t i c u s ' v i ew is less fraught with ambiguity, ye t cl e a r l y wrong (305.6-16): he ex p re s s l y equates the demiurge with the Good. It takes Pro clus only a few lines to reject this view : P l a t o calls the demiurge " g o o d " , but not "t h e G o o d " ; 4 4 m o re import a n t ly, the demiurge is an intellect, 4 5 w h e reas Plato undeniably puts the
Good ab o ve being (and thus ab o ve intellect).M o r e o ve r,what is A t t i c u s
going to do about the paradigm if the demiurge is the same as the Good? For the paradigm -the intelligi ble -ought to be prior to i n t e l l e c t , but then the Good would no longer be the supreme pri n c i p l e . I f, a l t e rn a t i ve ly, the paradigm coincided with the demiurge/the Good, the Good would not be one, but at least two things. Or if -third possibility -the paradigm we r e posterior to the demiurge/the Good, the Good would be contemplating something infe r i o r,h o r ribile dictu. i n : R E , Supplementband 7, 1 9 4 0 , c o l . ' ", w] n auj toav gaqon, Num. frg. 20 Des Places = Eus., P r. ev. X I , 2 2 , 9 -1 0 ) . T h e good is also "one": Num. frg. 19 = Eus. Pr. ev. X I , 2 2 , 6 -8 : ou{ tw toi oJ Plav twn ej k sullogismou' tw' / oj xu; blev ponti aj pev dwke to; aj gaqo; n o{ ti ej sti; n e{ n. Numenius does not take the good to be "beyond" being and the Fo r ms as something tra n s c e n d i n g them in an absolute way.
4 5 . See also in Ti m . 1 . 3 5 9 . 2 5 -2 6 ; 360.3-4. P l o t i n us is treated with considerably more respect and b e n e vo l e n c e . P r o c lus bases his account (1.305.16-306.1) of P l o t i nu s ' v i e w of the demiurge not only on E n n . III 9 [13] 1, w h i ch deals with the interpre t i ve p ro blems raised by Ti m . 39E7-9 (h | / p e r ou\ n nou' " ej nouv sa" ij dev a" tw' / o} e[ stin zw' / on, oi| aiv te e[ neisi kai; o{ sai, kaqora' / ,"A c c o r ding then, as Intellect perc e i v es Fo r ms ex i s t i n g in the Absolute Living Cre a t u r e , s u c h and so many as exist there i n did he determine that this world should possess." t r a n s . J. D i l l o n ) , 4 6 but also, as I have argued elsew h e r e , 4 7 on E n n . IV 4 [28] . It is t r ue that Ti m . 39E7-9 was central to the controve r sies related by P ro cl u s : Numenius pro b a bly based his doctrine of three gods on this passage , as did Amelius and T h e o d o r u s , and also Plotinu s ' Gnostic opponents. P l o t i n us rejected the interpretation of the latter in E n n . II 9 [33] and offe r s an independent discussion of the passage in E n n . III 9 [13] 1.Yet in my view there we re other, systemic and more cogent reasons that led to a dive r s i fication of d e m i u r gy and that can be observed in E n n . IV 4 [28] . In this tex t , P l o t i n us shows himself not quite at ease with the re s t r iction of d e m i u r gy to the intellective re a l m , and looks for a second " o r d e r i n g " p r inciple (which he refuses to call " d e m i u r gi c " , t h o u g h ) . H e re he ex p r esses himself not as cl e a r ly as he could have , and as a result he could easily be misunders t o o d .
Proclus' account of Plotinus' position can be seen as a summary of the re l e vant ch a p t e rs of E n n.IV 4 [28]:P l o t i nus appare n t ly make s the demiurge two fo l d , one in the intelligi ble wo r l d , the other the leader and ruler of the unive r s e . And this is corre c t , P ro clus say s . For the immanent principle gove r ning the world can in a sense also be called a demiurge. 48 As for the "higher demiurge", Plotinus calls him intelligi b le because he situates him, c o r re c t ly, in the hypostasis of Intellect,w h i ch is his name for the whole realm betwe e n the One and the wo r l d , w h e r eas Pro clus limits Intellect to the lowe s t l e vel of that re a l m . Another way of seeing this is that Pro cl u s distinguishes the paradigm,which is also called Intelligible Intellect [ 2 . 3 ] , and the demiurgic n o u ' ",w h i c h is intellect as such , w h e r eas fo r P l o t i n us these two intellects coincide in reality and are distinguishabl e o n ly conceptually : the demiurge considered as intellect at re s t (Kronos) contains the forms, while the demiurge considered as an actively thinking intellect (Zeus) contemplates the ideas. But this is a distinction, not a division. 49 In E n n . IV 4 [28] Plotinus indeed mentions two " c o s m o p o e i c " principles:
A Craftsman and his Handmaid e n . D e m i u rgy according to Plotinu s, i n : We l t e n t s t e h u n g , Weltseele und We l ts t ru k t u r.Platons Timaios als Gru n d t ex t der Ko s m o l o g ie in A n t i k e , M i t t e l a l t e r und
"But since the ord e r ing principle is two fo l d , we speak of one form of it as the craftsman and the other as the soul of the all; and when we speak of Zeus we sometimes apply the name to the c raftsman and sometimes to the ruling principle of the all." (∆ A l l ∆ ej pei; to; kosmou' n dittov n, to; me; n wJ " to; n dhmiourgo; n lev gomen, to; de; wJ " th; n tou' panto; " yuchv n, kai; to; n Div a lev gonte" oJ te; me; n wJ " ej pi; to; n dhmiourgo; n ferov meqa, oJ te; de; ej pi; to; hJ gemonou' n tou' pantov ". IV 4 [28] 10,1-4).
The second ruling principle is the soul, or its thinking, i . e . i t s i n t e l l e c t i ve aspect -Plotinu s ' wo rds remain somewhat vag u e . 5 0 P ro clus could take Plotinus to be re fe r ring to the intellect o f t h e world soul, w h e reas Po r p hy r y could claim that Plotinus just talks about "the soul or its intellective aspect", without needing to be more precise.
The reasons for distinguishing two demiurgic or " o r d e r i n g " l eve l s become apparent in Enn. IV 4 [28] . Whereas the Timaeus, at least when read in accordance with Neoplatonic hermeneutic pri n c i p l e s , cl e a r ly suggests that the demiurge is an intellect, P l o t i n u s ' u n d e rsta nding of what an intellect is makes it hard for him to accept that an intellect could do the kind of things the demiurge is descri b e d as doing. P l o t i nus sees intellect in essence as an A r istotelian selfthinking unmoved move r. S u ch a being would be incapable of d i s c u r s i v e thinking -the planning and deliberating -and of the kind of active, punctual interventions attributed to the demiurge in the Ti m a e u s .That is why these tasks are confe rred onto a lower pri n c i p l e . It is re m a r k a ble that those Middle Platonists who adopt an A r i s t o t e l i a n Études platoniciennes II interpretation of intellect (Numenius and Alcinous, e.g.) 51 likewise distinguish different levels of demiurgy. Moreover, Plotinus appears to think that the manual work of a craftsman is beneath the dignity of an intellect. H e re the old polemics with the Epicureans may have played a role: they had ridiculed Plato's demiurge for exactly this re a s o n . 5 2 P l o t i nu s ' account is ch a ra c t e rised by a ge n e ral tension between models of interpretation: 53 the demiurgic model, whereby o r der is imparted onto a pre -existing ch a o s , on the one hand, a n d the deri vation model, that had gra d u a l ly become dominant under the influence of the Neo-Pythagorean revival of the first centuries and that was clearly favoured by Plotinus.As a result, the demiurge was bound to become a rather sorry figure. 54 H i s t o ri c a l ly,P l o t i n u s ' t r eatment of the demiurge is situated betwe e n interpretations that identified the demiurge with the highest deity, and those of later Neoplatonists, who demoted the demiurge to some lower position within the intelligible.That option was not open to P l o t i n u s , who wo r ked with a simpler metaphysical sch e m e , b e c a u s e he refused to allow any real distinctions within the pri m a r y hy p o s t a s e s . So he equated the demiurge with intellect, but tra n s f e r re d as many of his activities as he could to the soul.This solution was not new either.As the most direct influence on Plotinus the Gnostics have been suggested, 55 but also the Stoic active principle comes to mind, which was called, besides many other things, both demiurge and world soul. 5 6 The idea, h owe ve r, is still older. A l re a dy in the E p i n o m i s the highest kind of soul, w h i c h possesses intellige n c e ( 9 8 2 b 5 ) , is said to be the only thing suitable to mold and cra f t (plav ttein kai; dhmiourgei' n, 981B8).
As I have already pointed out, Plotinus refuses to call the soul a d e m i u r ge . U n fo r t u n a t e ly, he did not always ex p ress himself as u n a m b i g u o u s l y as he should have . By calling intellect the re a l d e m i u r ge , 5 7 he seems to suggest that there is another,lesser demiurge . What is more , E n n . lends some support to Po r p h y r y 's claim that Plotinus considered the world soul a second demiurge , e s p e c i a l l y since Plotinus in his initial paraphrase of the Timaeus passage supplies the word "demiurge" as the grammatical subject of the " p l a n n i n g " , and concludes his i n t e r p retation with the suggestion that it is soul who does the planning. Next in Proclus' doxography comes Amelius (the lesser known of Plotinus' pupils, the name of whom has been all but eclipsed by that of Porphyry), according to whom the demiurge is threefold, all three of them Intellects (1.306.1-31): 58 he who is, he who has, and he who sees.The first intellect truly is what he is; the second is the i n t e l l i g i b le that is inside of him, but mere l y h a s the intelligi b l e p r eceding him; the third i s the intelligi ble that is inside of him, 5 9 b u t h a s the intelligi b le that is in the second, and mere l y s e e s t h e intelligible that is in the first. Proclus could very well endorse the type of argument deployed by Amelius: the paradigm is present in the three diffe r ent intellects, a c c o r ding to the principle that "everything is contained in everything appropriately". 60 Moreover, in other contexts Pro clus himself can be found to apply the distinction "to be, to have, to see" to Intellect. 61 And indeed, Proclus does not criticise the triple division as such , 6 2 but points out (1.306.14-15: a[ xion ou\ n ej kei' na kai; pro; " tou' ton lev gein) that every multitude is preceded by unity and eve r y triad by a monad.T h e r e f o r e there has to be a demiurgic monad prior to the triad.The universal d e m i u r ge Timaeus is re fe r ring to in the present lemma must be this demiurgic monad. P r o cl u s ' objections entire ly stem from his own metaphysical system, but so do the reasons for his positive appreciation of this predecessor.
Porphyry, whose interpretation of "maker and father"has already been refuted in the l exe i s-s e c t i o n , once again cannot count on mu ch s y m p a t hy (1.306.31-307.14): he thinks he is fo l l owi ng Plotinu s , 6 3 but this claim is rejected by Proclus. Proclus tells us that Porphyry re g a r ds the hy p e r cosmic soul as the demiurge , and equates the intellect belonging to this soul with the paradigm (the auj tozw/ ' on). To consider the demiurge as a soul 64 is of course utter foolishness a c c o r ding to Pro c l u s : Plato calls the demiurge n o u ' " , not y u c h v . M o r e ove r, the demiurge creates and transcends soul. If the wo r l dsoul were the demiurge, it would moreover be impossible for Plato to call the world a go d , 6 5 for what makes the world a god is the p r esence of the world soul in it. I f , h owe ve r, the soul we re the d e m i u rge , it would have to be outside of the world and could hence no longer be present in the world. Proclus' final argument is based on the Neoplatonic conception of causality: the demiurge is we l l capable of creating (partial) encosmic intellects and gods, whereas soul could never do that, for it would be causing beings surpassing itself in ex c e l l e n c e . But causes are always ontologi c a l ly prior to their effects.
Porphyry intended his account of demiurgy to be an elucidation of the thought of Plotinus. His demiurge and paradigmatic intellect are meant to correspond to Plotinus' (alleged) distinction between an immanent and a transcendent demiurge , i . e . b e t ween the thinking soul as the second ord e r ing pri n c i p l e , and the immobile intellect as the true demiurge . It does not look as if Pro c lus has made an honest attempt to gi v e a fair account of Po r p hy r y 's view s . O n ly a d r astic simplification can occasion the re p r o a c h that Po r p hy r y posited a stra i g h t f o r w a rd equation of the demiurge with the world soul and thus banished the demiurge from the realm of intellect. A c t u a l l y, Porphyry repeatedly calls the demiurge an intellect.W. Deuse, who has cl o s e l y examined all the re l e vant fragments and testimonies c o n cludes that for Po r p hy r y there was no great divide betwe e n the realms of soul and intellect. 6 6 The identification of the demiurge with soul does not automatically imply that he is denied an intellective ex i s t e n c e . Po r p h y r y conceives of demiurgy as a steady gliding dow n and self-development of intellect, that in his lowest manife s t a t i o n becomes the transcendent soul, m a ker of the world of becoming and division. For Po r p h y r y there is no contradiction between talking of the demiurge as a soul and as an intellect; it is just that at the end of the demiurgic process we find the soul taking over matter and imposing order on it.
That some being could be soul and intellect at the same time wa s a ghastly idea for a late Athenian Neoplatonist such as Proclus.Yet Porphyry did not seem to have problems with it. Neither, I should a d d , did some of his near contempora r i e s . Numenius too appears to re f er occasionally to his third , d e m i u rgi c , intellect as a soul.S eve ra l s ch o l a r s have argued that he considers the world soul to be the d e m i u r ge . 6 7 Numenius is known for saying that soul is i n d i s t i n g u i s h abl y and inseparably identical with its pri n c i p l e s , 6 8 a n d c o n ve r s e l y ascribes to the demiurge certain attributes and functions that are cl e a r l y those of the world soul. 6 9 Po r p h y r y 's and Numenius' views on demiurgy are in fact remarkably similar. Both allow for a dynamic continuum in which the boundaries between deities are not always sharp, in which entities divide into two and merge again into one. Even Plotinus, as we have seen, did not clearly distinguish b e t w een soul, the intelligising soul or the intellect o f the soul.P r o c l u s , h oweve r, insists on cl e a r -c u t , we l l -d e fi n ed and stable distinctions between hypostases. P ro clus is mu ch more sympathetic to Iambl i chus (1.307.14-3 0 9 . 1 3 ) . The "divine Iambl i ch u s " gets more cre d i t , despite allege d inconsistencies and ambiguities in his interpretation. Proclus starts o f f by saying that Iambl i chu s went to great lengths to counter Porphyry 70 and to expose the latter's interpretation as un-Plotinian. Proclus adds that Iamblichus himself, in his own Commentary on the Timaeus (frg. 34 Dillon), concurs with Plotinus in equating the d e m i u r ge with the entire intelligi ble re a l m . In support of this assert i o n P ro clus even includes a literal quotation from Iambl i ch u s ' c o m m e n t a r y, w h i ch pre s u m abl y contains a re f e r ence to the passage at hand.
But after him (Po r p h y r y) the divine Iambl i ch u s , a t t a c king the theory of Po r p h y r y at length,and condemning it as being un-Plotinian, in gi v i n g his own theology, denominates the whole intelligi ble cosmos as the i n t e l l e c t i v e tri a d s , the seve n t h , i n t e l l e c t i ve tri a d . 7 6 This emendation 7 7 is supported by an ancient scholion in the C o i s l i n i a nu s re l a t i n g I a m b l i ch u s ' v i e w. 7 8 If it is corre c t , I a m bl i ch u s ' s t r u c t u re of the entire "intelligible universe" would almost coincide with that of Proclus. P r o c lus concludes that Iambl i c h u s ' t h e o l o gy deserves to be judge d on the basis of this text rather than the treatment in his commentary, which is superficial and ambiguous if not erroneous.We can easily understand the reason for Proclus' sympathy for Iamblichus: it was he who inaugurated an evolution away from the Plotinian monolithic conception of the intelligi b le towa r ds a mu l t i -l a ye r ed stru c t u r e cl o s e l y resembling that endorsed by Syrianus and Proclus. 79 Last in the row of " a n c i e n t s " comes T h e o d o r u s , pupil of Po r p hy r y and of Iambl i ch u s , but also their opponent, and too eccentric or o r i g inal ever to become canonical. Not unlike A m e l i u s , h e distinguishes three demiurge s . His threesome consists of " s u b s t a n t i a l intellect"(or:"the intellect which is being"),"intellective substance" ( o r : " p u re intellect") and the " s o u rce of the souls" ( 1 . 3 0 9 . 1 4 -2 0 ) . T h e o d o rus does not situate these three demiurges immediately after the One (as Amelius had done), 8 0 but after the intellective -i n t e l l i gi b l e go d s , 8 1 in other wo rd s , on the level of Iambl i ch u s ' i n t e l l e c t i v e tri a d . 8 2 This explains why Proclus tries to argue (1.309.20-310.2) that only " i n t e l l e c t i v e substance"can ri g h t l y be identified with the demiurgi c i n t e l l e c t . One would also have to ch a n g e the order of T h e o d o r u s ' threesome and assign the middle position to the "source of souls"; i n d e e d , " p owe r " or " l i f e " has this position in any tri a d . Fi n a l ly the name of the now second god should be ch a n g ed from " s o u r ce of Études platoniciennes II 8 3 . One could arg u e , h owe ve r, t h a t I a m bl i c hus actually developed cert a i n tendencies alre a dy present in Plotinu s ' work.
84.The introduction to the Platonic Th e o l o g y contains a famous glori fi c a t i o n of the Platonic philosophers who revealed Plato's mystical insight in their sacre d i n t e r p r etations and who themselve s have received a nature not unlike that of their guide,P l a t o : P l o t i nus was fi r s t , t h e n came his disciples Amelius and Po r p hy r y, and third ly their disciples Iambl i ch u s and T h e o d o r us ("statues of wisdom") fo llowed by a number of others. From this tradition the authentic and pure light of truth came down to Syrianus, who communicated it to Proclus himself (Theol. P l a t . I 1, p . 6 . 1 6 -7 . 8 ) .This historical const r uction enables Pro c lus to consider himin philosophical style between Porphyry and Iamblichus which led to two currents in Neoplatonism was commonly re c o g n i s e d , a n d had alre a d y been emphasised by Iambl i chu s himself. I a m bl i ch u s d e f ined his own appro a c h as more " h i e r a t i c " as opposed to the more s o b e r l y philosophical style of Po r p h y r y, and accord i n g l y awa rded an important place to theurgy. 85 It is clear that Proclus counts himself as belonging to the Iambl i chean tra d i t i o n . 8 6 Later Damascius will c o n f i r m the existence of these two tra d i t i o n s , 8 7 not without adding, h o weve r,that Plato united the two appro a c hes into one single tru t h . 8 8
The mysticism of the tradition to which Pro clus belongs is nicely i l l u s t r ated in the l exe i s -section of the present lemma. 8 9 T h e re (1.300.28-303.23) Pro clus explains why Plato says it is difficult to find the demiurge and impossible to communicate this knowledge to others. In order to discover the demiurge the philosopher has to ascend from the lower realities towa r ds the superior leve l s . H o weve r, m o r e is needed.The soul has to become itself an " i n t e l l e c t i v e unive rs e " (kov smon noerov n) ; it has to assimilate itself as mu ch as possible to the intelligi ble unive rs e 9 0 and thus appro a c h the go d . In this manner the soul will discover the demiurge. It will neither "stumble upon"
